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The section “Anti/Thesis” juxtaposes 
two rivaling positions on a controver-
sial issue related to the topic in focus. 
Due to the number of recent academic 
debates which address the role of the 
middle class in the Arab uprisings, this 
issue’s “Anti/Thesis” is dedicated to the 
controversy around the argument which 
casts the middle class as “motor of the 
Arab Spring.” While Benoît Challand ar-
gues that the constellation of actors in 
the uprisings of 2011 was too complex 
to be reduced to the middle class, Ra-
chid Ouaissa understands the middle 
class not as a driving force per se, but 
as the central group of supporters for a 
political force.
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Scholars of revolutions or of so-called 
democratic transitions all face the thorny 
question of what specific role classes play 
in the reshaping of political and social sys-
tems at critical junctures. Often the middle 
class is seen as a necessary stepping stone 
on which new alliances are forged, and 
thus becomes an essential “ingredient” for 
political change.
In this short text, I would like to offer a dif-
ferent view than that offered in the Thesis 
section. My argument is that it is both mis-
leading to expect, and difficult to identify, 
a clear role for the middle class in complex 
events such as those of the Arab uprisings. 
Furthermore, the transnational ramifica-
tions of class-making are so significant in 
the Arab Middle East that it becomes im-
possible to locate or pin down a clear role 
for the middle class within domestic 
borders. One is forced instead to adopt a 
larger, regional and international focus to 
understand how, and which classes are 
differently involved in these moments of 
upheaval. The specificities of Arab political 
and economic systems force us thus to 
transcend any too-narrow methodological 
nationalism. I will therefore concentrate on 
two sets of arguments: the first question-
ing normative expectations around mid-
dle classes, and the second pointing at 
external factors such as economic rents 
and the existence of a transnational bour-
geoisie whose span of action and influ-
ence is not limited to domestic borders. 
Let us start with normative views accom-
panying discourses on the middle class.
There are many interpretations of what 
role class plays in the making and unfold-
ing of revolutions. The danger is to selec-
tively examine moments when the middle 
class appears a key component in leading 
political change; one could, however, se-
lect other episodes of such rebellions that 
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shed a less favorable light on middle 
classes. With regard to the Arab uprisings 
of 2011, some of these analyses force par-
allels with European history and try to de-
fend the view that the middle class has 
been a motor of the Arab Spring. If by this 
we mean to assess whether the middle 
class was a trigger and essential compo-
nent of the wave of protests, it is hard to 
argue against such view. Revolutions have 
by and large been bourgeois events—and 
the original moment of the Arab uprisings 
fits this pattern, with vast sections of the 
middle class (though not only) in the early 
months of 2011 taking to the streets for 
their first time—from Sanaa to Tunis, and 
from Cairo to Manama. Indeed, even in the 
latter case, where revolution is usually de-
scribed in simplistic terms of a Shiite-Sunni 
divide, the initial protest in Bahrain includ-
ed not just the disgruntled local Shiite 
population, but also segments of the 
Sunni middle class as well as organized 
labor (Achcar 162; Lynch 136-37). Without 
the support of (at least) portions of liberal 
professions and middle class, no revolu-
tion is likely to occur—and this has been 
the case in all Arab countries in 2011.
If, however, we are asking whether the 
middle class has supported a continuous 
effort toward more social justice and a 
structural change in the pattern of eco-
nomic and political redistribution, it is ob-
vious that the middle class has not at all 
been a motor for the Arab uprisings. Two 
series of episodes can substantiate this 
claim. On the one hand, a look at the role 
of lower classes in these revolts shows the 
complex and overlapping composition of 
political activism. On the other, recent 
events—like those in Egypt during the 
summer of 2013—cast doubt on the auto-
matically positive expectation (in terms of 
transition and democratization) that is 
often attached to middle class.
In the first series, it is obvious that the mar-
ginalized and lower classes are the ones 
willing to exert political pressure to keep 
the motor of the Arab uprisings going, so 
to say. Think of Tunisia, where youth and 
“marginalized Tunisians” were pivotal in 
contributing to the second phase of 
protests, after Ben Ali had departed the 
country when the second Qasbah pro-
tests in February and March 2011 forced 
acceptance of the fall elections and the 
drafting of a new constitution (Gana 18). 
Think of Yemen, where akhdām (“lower 
caste servants”), disenfranchized groups 
in the north, and excluded portions of the 
south pushed for realization of a similar 
national dialogue after the departure of 
Ali Abdullah Saleh (Finn; Carapico 102-10). 
Similarly, it is youth activists of differing 
social backgrounds who since March 2011 
have called for an end to political divi-
sions in Palestine. At the end of 2011 in 
Egypt, when it became clear that the po-
lice state was still pulling the strings even 
after the fall of President Mubarak, the No-
vember street battles—such as those of 
Muhammad Mahmoud street—belonged 
to the lower segments of Egyptian societ-
ies, not the twitterati that were so central 
in January and February of the same year. 
Alliances have surely been formed, but 
not just between incumbent elites and the 
middle classes: shared pressures be-
tween lower and middle classes also need 
to be included in our comparative analy-
ses of the Arab uprisings.1
The second series of episodes, casting a 
less positive light on the involvement of 
the middle class, stems from the end of 
President Morsi’s power tenure in summer 
2013 and post-Rabia al-Adawiyya2 events. 
To say, as my colleague does in his Thesis, 
that both the military and Brother Morsi 
have tried to court the middle classes to 
forge alliances, is to take away from the 
middle class its agency and comprehend 
this vast social group as a monolith and as 
simple passive weight that both sides 
have tried to push on its side of the bal-
ance. Let us not forget that some sizable 
portions of the middle class, in particular 
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its “liberal” segments (precisely the seg-
ment supposed to lead in the opening of 
autocratic systems in mainstream democ-
ratization theories), have taken an anti-lib-
eral stance in supporting the military 
crackdown of August 2013. Supporting 
emergency measures and the massive 
curtailment of civil rights (freedom of ex-
pression, discriminate detention of mem-
bers of the Brotherhood, and, as of March 
2014, a string of massive death sentences), 
as has been the case in Egypt in the last 
nine months, is not likely to hasten reform 
towards more social justice and human 
dignity. The same charge of non-inclusion 
can be leveled against the Brotherhood’s 
neo-liberal middle class, which has pushed 
neither for more economic enfranchise-
ment, nor for more social justice while 
Morsi was in power.
Emerging from these short discussions is 
the view that middle class involvement in 
these uprisings presents a mixed balance 
sheet, with positive and negative contri-
butions to a revolutionary transformation.
Let us now turn to the second part of the 
argument, namely the existence of exter-
nal factors and the need to avoid the 
traps of domestic analyses only. Of inter-
est here is the existence of variegated 
forms of rents and the existence of a 
transnational bourgeoisie in the process 
of making clearly identifiable social class-
es. All this contributes to making quite a 
unique configuration in the Arab Middle 
East.
To understand this specificity and avoid 
essentialist narratives of Middle Eastern 
exceptionalism, a historical understand-
ing of class formation in the region is nec-
essary. In large part, I follow the argument 
that has been made elsewhere and is re-
layed here by Rachid Ouaissa (257-77). 
Indeed, a look at the social history of the 
Arab Middle East demonstrates that the 
making of the middle class has not been 
connected with the development of in-
dustrial production or to tax enfranchise-
ment, as was the case in Europe. Instead, 
it has been mostly based on rent 
economies, the latest manifestation of 
which is the rent attached to foreign aid 
and to a life geared toward individual 
consumption. He is thus absolutely cor-
rect in maintaining that the Arab middle 
classes have not been able to develop 
any meaningful instrument to push for 
structural changes in the 2011 uprisings, 
and thus their engagement with these 
uprisings has been motivated by a world-
view that is based in this individualistic 
lifestyle (273), and the resilience of an or-
ganized clientele around ruling classes.
But one also needs to insist on a recent 
externalist explanation of the rather su-
perficial involvement of the middle class 
in the follow-up to the revolts. The focus 
in many of the approaches taken in politi-
cal science and sociology on the subject 
tends to reinforce a bias toward method-
ological nationalism—that is, the a priori 
selection of variables relating uniquely to 
internal political or sociological process-
es. For example, if the bourgeoisie (be it 
the “would-be middle class” of Khos-
rokhavar [60-91], or the “middle class 
poor” of Bayat [44]) is described as defec-
tive, this is due to the nature of the politi-
cal system (autocracy), or to internal divi-
sions created by political Islam. In other 
words, all these accounts privilege inter-
nalist processes of political change (a 
view reproduced in the Thesis’ article with 
its focus on the making and unmaking of 
local alliances). What these explanations 
fail to recognize is that the process of 
class formation is connected as much to 
external factors as to internal ones. Sandra 
Halperin noted long ago that the system-
atic crushing of left-radical groups during 
the Cold War led to massive out-migra-
tion of the middle class, skewing the 
balance between different classes and 
thwarting the emergence of vivid class 
consciousness (a key ingredient to class 
participation in political processes).
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It is here that an analysis of the middle 
class needs to engage with regional and 
international influences. If rent is gener-
ally associated with oil, one needs to 
look not only at the rent provided by in-
ternational aid (Egypt, Palestine, Jordan 
have received vast amounts, both from 
the USA and from the EU), but also at the 
increasing flow of Gulf capital into coun-
tries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Pales-
tine. Adam Hanieh has powerfully de-
monstrated that the traditional divisions 
of state versus society—or a vision of class 
formation limited to national borders—
fail to capture the vivid and massive influ-
ence that transnational non-state actors 
(e.g. global capitalist classes)3 play in 
shaping the future of Arab politics. We 
can see examples of this influence in 
Egypt (with the plug being pulled on the 
Muslim Brotherhood this past summer 
by some of that capitalist class fearing 
loss of control over their assets and joint 
investments with the Egyptian military), 
but also the reconstruction of Libya, and 
part of the fate of Tunisian and Palestini-
an politics. Hanieh uses a felicitous de-
scription for this intermingling of class 
formation, in the high degree of Gulf 
capitalists’ investments in other Arab 
countries as “the Gulf bourgeoisie” be-
coming “an internal bourgeoisie into 
Egypt” (139).
We have now a transnational bourgeoisie 
playing a political (conservative) role that 
is often unaccounted for. Be it in Palestine 
with President Abbas and some of his net-
work who made their fortune in the Gulf 
(Rabbani); be it in Libya with past interim 
Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril whose 
connections in Kuwait, Lebanon, and 
Qatar helped him become a key figure of 
Libyan transition (Prashad 138-40); or anti-
Brotherhood sentiments expressed by the 
checkbook diplomacy of the Saudi family 
or from the United Arab Emirates, one can 
see that not only state rents shape and un-
dermine the prospect of more democratic 
change in the region; but also that a pow-
erful capitalist class, international in its 
composition and outlook, is failing the 
Arab uprisings’ genuinely popular aspira-
tion for political change and economic re-
form in order to preserve its own interests 
and investments in other countries.
In that sense, questioning the role of an 
evanescent middle class is misleading. 
What needs to be assessed is the flow of 
three different rents: oil rent in its different 
forms, non-oil rent that is transnational 
(and mostly intra-Arab) and that has deep 
capitalist imbrications in the national 
economies of countries that are part of the 
“Arab Spring,” and the bureaucratic de-
generation linked to foreign aid. This last 
aspect can be connected to a critique of 
institutionalized or NGO-ized civil society, 
which might be seen as having a detri-
mental role in terms of class formation. In-
deed, NGOs all too often focus solely on 
their economic and institutional survival, 
and reproduce a middle class discon-
nected, paradoxically, from lower classes 
and popular aspirations they are sup-
posed to help and represent through 
social work (Challand, Palestinian Civil 
Society 185-88, 192-98; “The Counter-Pow-
er” 275).
Instead, we should look for motors of the 
Arab uprisings in the less institutionalized 
type of activism, and in the revolutionary 
capacity of different groups and classes to 
come together. These processes have 
been termed “de-sectorialization” 
(Bonnefoy and Piorier), or intersectionality. 
The latter term (Challand, “Citizenship”) al-
lows us to reflect on the relevance of re-
gional and external factors, such as rent 
and migration, and how these intersect 
with internal factors to influence the dy-
namics of various national uprisings. Fi-
nally, this term also reminds us that change 
will only come from the combined efforts 
of both the lower and the middle classes, 
separate from the state bourgeoisie and 
transnational capitalists’ interests in main-
taining a truncated social contract.
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Notes
1  For a general discussion on 
the role of lower classes in 
keeping revolutions alive, see 
Chibber, esp. chap. 3-4.
2  Rabia al-Adawiyya is the 
name of the square in Cairo 
where pro-Morsi supporters 
built an encampment after 
the massive June 2013 
protests organized, among 
others, by the Tamarod 
(“rebel”) movement. The 
military violently overtook 
the square mid-August 2013. 
A very polarized debate 
emerged in Egyptian society 
as to whether the use of 
extreme violence (victims 
were in the hundreds) was 
justified or not.
3  I prefer using the plural 
“global classes” to show the 
variety within.
Cited Works
Achcar, Gilbert. The People 
Want: A Radical Exploration 
of the Arab Uprising. 
Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2013. Print.
Bayat, Asef. Life as Politics: 
How Ordinary People 
Change the Middle East. 
Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2010. Print.
Bonnefoy, Laurent, and 
Marine Piorier. “The 
Structuration of the Yemeni 
Revolution: An Attempt 
at Analysing an Ongoing 
Process.” Revue française 
de science politique 62.5/6 
(2012): 895-913. Print.
Carapico, Sheila. “Yemen.” 
Dispatches from the Arab 
Spring. Ed. Paul Amar and 
Vijay Prashad. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 
2013. Print.
Challand, Benoît. 
“Citizenship against the 
Grain: Locating the Spirit 
of the Arab Uprisings in 
Times of Counterrevolution.” 
Constellations 20.2 (2013): 
169-87. academia.eu. Web. 14 
Mar. 2014.
__. “The Counter-Power 
of Civil Society and the 
Emergence of a New Political 
Imaginary in the Arab World.” 
Constellations 18.3 (2011): 
271-83. academia.eu. Web. 14 
Mar. 2014.
__. Palestinian Civil Society: 
Foreign Donors and the 
Power to Promote and 
Exclude. London: Routledge, 
2009. Print.
Chibber, Vivek. Postcolonial 
Theory and the Specter of 
Capital. London: Verso, 2013. 
Print.
Finn, Tom. “In Revolt: Yemeni 
‘Untouchables’ Hope for Path 
Out of Misery.” reuters.com. 
Reuters, 7 Mar. 2012. Web. 14 
Mar. 2014.
Gana, Nouri. “Tunisia.” 
Dispatches from the Arab 
Spring. Ed. Paul Amar and 
Vijay Prashad. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 
2013. Print.
Halperin, Sandra. “The 
Post-Cold War Political 
Topography of the 
Middle East: Prospects for 
Democracy.” Third World 
Quarterly 26.7 (2005): 1135-




Hanieh, Adam. Lineages 
of Revolt: Issues of 
Contemporary Capitalism 
in the Middle East. London: 
Haymarket, 2013. Print.
Khosrokhavar, Farhad. The 
New Arab Revolutions that 
Shook the World. Boulder, 
London: Paradigm, 2012. 
Print.
Lynch, Marc. The Arab 
Spring: The Unfinished 
Revolutions of the New 
Middle East. New York: Public 
Affairs Books, 2012. Print.
Ouaissa, Rachid. “Blockierte 
Mittelschichten als Motor 
der Veränderungen in 
der arabischen Welt?” 
Arabellions: Zur Vielfalt von 
Protest und Revolte im Nahen 
Osten und Nordafrika. Ed. 
Annette Jünemann and Anja 
Zorob. Wiesbaden: Springer, 
2013. Print. 257-77. 
Prashad, Viyad. Arab Spring, 
Libyan Winter. Edinburgh: AK 
Press, 2012. Print.
Rabbani, Mouin. “Qatar 
and the Palestinians.” 
jadaliyya.com. Arab Studies 
Institute, 1 Dec. 2012. Web. 14 
Mar. 2014.
